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Analyzing the Anticipation of Treatments 
Using Data on Notification Dates
* 
 
When treatments may occur at different points in time, most evaluation methods assume – 
implicitly or explicitly – that all the information used by subjects about the occurrence of a 
future treatment is available to the researcher. This is often called the “no anticipation” 
assumption. In reality, subjects may receive private signals about the date when a treatment 
may start. We provide a methodological and empirical analysis of this issue in a setting 
where the outcome of interest as well as the moment of information arrival (notification) and 
the start of the treatment can all be characterized by duration variables. Building on the 
“Timing of Events” approach, we show that the causal effects of notification and of the 
treatment on the outcome are identified. We estimate the model on an administrative data set 
of unemployed workers in France which provides the date when job seekers receive 
information from caseworkers about their future treatment status. We find that notification has 
a significant and positive effect on unemployment duration. This result violates the standard 
“no anticipation” assumption and rules out a “threat effect” of training programs in France. 
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Treatment evaluation problems are often of a dynamic nature. For instance, one may be
interested in knowing how the duration an individual spends in a state of interest (say, unem-
ployment) is a®ected by the moment at which he receives a given treatment (say, training).
Over the last ¯fteen years, new techniques have been developed for the analysis of dynamic
treatments. The statistical literature has taken the standard static evaluation framework
with potential outcomes, conditional independence, and selection on observables (the Ru-
bin model, 1974) to dynamic discrete-time settings (see Robins, 1997, Lechner, Miquel and
Wunsch, 2004, Fredriksson and Johansson, 2008, and Cr¶ epon, Ferracci, Jolivet and Van den
Berg, 2009). Eberwein, Ham and LaLonde (1997) develop a bivariate discrete duration model
where both the treatment and the outcome are duration variables and allow for selection on
unobservables. An exclusion restriction is used to identify the causal e®ect of interest. Ab-
bring and Van den Berg (2003a, henceforth AVdB) prove identi¯cation of a continuous-time
bivariate duration model with selection on unobservables but without instrumental variables,
by exploiting variation in the timing of the treatment versus the outcome. This approach is
referred to as the \Timing of Events" approach. A common feature of all these approaches
is that they hinge on a crucial assumption which we will refer to as the \no anticipation"
(NA) assumption.
In words, the NA assumption states that \the future cannot cause the past", i.e. that
an individual's potential outcomes do not depend on future treatments. In our empirical
application, the NA assumption implies that the probability that an individual leaves unem-
ployment today is the same whether he will enter a training program tomorrow or next year.
As emphasized by AVdB and Abbring and Heckman (2008), it is useful to interpret this
assumption in terms of information accumulation over time. If the individual's information
set relevant to the future treatment status is ¯xed over time then inference can proceed in the
usual way. In the Timing of Events setting, if this information set is identical for individuals
with identical characteristics, then information accumulation may be captured by the model
speci¯cation to be estimated (see AVdB).
However, if individuals receive at random dates some information shocks that are un-
observed by the econometrician, and if they act on the new information, then the NA as-
sumption may be violated. Such a violation of the NA assumption is often plausible. For
instance, in the case of active labor market policies, the caseworker may inform the unem-
ployed worker that he has been assigned to a particular treatment (like a training course)
that is likely to start within a few weeks. Individuals may act on this information and either
wait for the treatment to begin (unemployed workers may stop searching for jobs if they are
2about to enter a training program) or try to avoid the treatment (unemployed workers may
take any job o®er in order not to be locked in a training program for several weeks).
As mentioned by AVdB, if the arrival of information is observed by the econometrician,
then one way to circumvent the NA assumption is to rede¯ne the problem as an evaluation of
the causal e®ect of the arrival of information.1 Ideally, one would like to be able to evaluate
both the arrival of information and the actual treatment. This is what the present paper
sets out to achieve.
Speci¯cally, in this paper, we consider the case where the arrival of information is ob-
served, and we address the full evaluation problem from a methodological and an applied
perspective. First, we extend the Timing of Events approach to allow for the arrival of
noti¯cation shocks that may in°uence the outcome before the treatment starts. Then, we
turn to an empirical application where we use information on noti¯cation dates from an
administrative data set on unemployed workers in France to test the NA assumption and
run an evaluation of training programs when the NA assumption may not hold.
We extend the bivariate duration model adopted in the Timing of Events approach to
account for the arrival of a shock that provides individuals with (more) information on their
future treatment status. We model the process ruling the arrival of these noti¯cation shocks
in a similar fashion as those ruling treatment and exit dates. Hence, as will be clear from
the presentation of the model in section 2, our approach basically consists in adding one
layer to the standard AVdB model. As motivated by our empirical application, we allow
for individuals to be treated without noti¯cation and for treatment dates to be stochastic
conditional on noti¯cation. The three processes at play may be interrelated through indi-
vidual observed and unobserved heterogeneity. Assuming a mixed-proportional structure for
the hazard rates, as do AVdB, we can identify the distribution of unobserved heterogene-
ity from the competing-risks part of the model. Any further correlation between the three
durations of interest can then be interpreted as causal. We model four di®erent e®ects: the
e®ect of noti¯cation on treatment, the e®ect of noti¯cation on exit, the e®ect of treatment
with no noti¯cation on exit and the e®ect of treatment preceded by noti¯cation on exit. We
show that these treatment e®ects are identi¯ed and provide an additional result stating that
identi¯cation of the e®ects of noti¯cation on treatment and exit can be achieved without
1An important alternative approach is developed by Heckman and Navarro (2007). They build on the
dynamic discrete-choice literature to propose a discrete-time reduced-form model identi¯ed without the NA
assumption. This approach requires variation in period-speci¯c instrumental variables, and some exogeneity
in the arrival of information shocks. Yet another alternative is to treat information shocks as individual
time-varying unobserved heterogeneity. AVdB show that their model can be extended to account for this
by using multiple-spell data. However, this may be di±cult in practice, as the time needed to gather data
on multiple spells may put into question other features of the AVdB model, in particular the stationarity
assumption implicit in the mixed-proportional speci¯cation of the hazard rates.
3imposing any speci¯cation on the e®ects of treatment (with and without noti¯cation) on
exit. Our test of the NA assumption will be based on the direct e®ect of noti¯cation on exit.
If this e®ect is found to be signi¯cant, then noti¯cation acts as an information shock that
a®ects individuals' future before they are treated and the NA assumption is violated.
Contrary to the usual case, we allow potential outcomes to di®er in the time interval
prior to treatment. However, it is intuitively plausible that the addition of an \information
arrival" layer below the usual evaluation framework implies that a new NA assumption is
required concerning the moment at which information about the future treatment arrives.
Speci¯cally, we have to assume that an individual's potential outcomes do not depend on
future noti¯cation, and that noti¯ed individuals' potential outcomes do not depend on future
treatments. We thus assume that noti¯cation is the only source of variation in individuals'
information set. Lastly, we follow the vast majority of the treatment literature and assume
that an individual's outcome is not a®ected by another individual's noti¯cation or treatment
status.2
We take our model to a French administrative register data set that contains all unem-
ployment and training spells experienced by workers in the greater Paris area (Ile-de-France)
between 2002 and 2005. In addition to reporting the dates when each worker enters/leaves
unemployment or, where relevant, participates in a training program, this data set contains
the date when a worker is informed by a caseworker that he is put in contact with a training
provider, which is the ¯rst step towards state-provided training. We use this information as
the noti¯cation date. It is important to mention that in France unemployed workers can start
a training program without having been noti¯ed by caseworkers (in particular when they
take the initiative of training). Also, workers who receive noti¯cation from a caseworker do
not necessarily face sanctions on their unemployment bene¯ts if they shun away from train-
ing (they do in theory but sanctions are almost never taken in practice). In this empirical
application, we are interested in the e®ect of noti¯cation on exit from unemployment, the
e®ect of noti¯cation on training (to a lesser extent) and lastly the e®ect of training on exit
from unemployment. This latter e®ect may depend on whether the training program was
preceded by noti¯cation or not.
A range of existing empirical papers study closely related topics. Some studies exploit
unusually rich data or institutional settings in order to examine the extent to which individ-
uals adjust their behavior in response to knowledge about the moment of future treatments.
Lalive, Van Ours and ZweimÄ uller (2005) use Swiss data that contain the moment at which
2This is the stable unit treatment value assumption introduced by Neyman (1923) that rules out equi-
librium e®ects of the treatment. See Ferracci, Jolivet and Van den Berg (2010) for an empirical analysis of
this assumption.
4the public employment service warns unemployed individuals that they will receive a ben-
e¯ts sanction before it is actually implemented, and they show that this warning increases
the propensity to leave unemployment.3 For this purpose they estimate an extension of the
model of AVdB. Our study di®ers from Lalive et al. (2005) in several aspects, apart from
the fact that the two studies analyze completely di®erent treatments and noti¯cations. In
our application, noti¯cation does not mechanically lead to a treatment or a sanction. Also,
whereas in Lalive et al. (2005) warnings always precede sanctions, our model allows for
individuals to be treated without having received noti¯cation. Lastly, we take a closer look
at the identi¯cation of our model and show that the e®ect of noti¯cation can be identi¯ed
without putting any structure on the e®ect of training. Cockx and Dejemeppe (2007) use
a regression discontinuity approach to show that the noti¯cation of job search monitoring
exerts a \threat e®ect" in Belgium as well. De Giorgi (2005) and Van den Berg, Bozio
and Costa Dias (2010) study the e®ects of the announcement that a \job search assistance"
treatment will take place at a ¯xed future date on the probability of moving to employment,
by comparing a situation where individuals become aware of the moment of the future treat-
ment to situations where the policy regime has not yet been introduced. In all these cases,
anticipation of the future treatment is found to a®ect the outcome.4
Our paper also contributes to the empirical literature evaluating the e®ect of training
programs for unemployed workers. This issue has been at the center of the evaluation
literature in economics (see Heckman, Lalonde and Smith, 1999, for a survey). Recent
evaluations incorporate dynamics (Sianesi, 2004, Cr¶ epon et al., 2009, Richardson and Van
den Berg, 2006). In France, a recent study by Cr¶ epon, Ferracci and Fougµ ere (2007) using
the Timing of Events approach ¯nds that training programs have little e®ect, if any, on exit
from unemployment. However, modeling the duration of the subsequent employment spell,
they ¯nd that the recurrence of unemployment is reduced by training. Our study will enrich
the analysis of training programs by providing results on the e®ect of noti¯cation and by
showing whether the e®ect of training depends on noti¯cation.
3See also Arni, Lalive and Van Ours (2009) who study the e®ect of warnings and sanctions on employment
outcomes.
4There is a strong similarity between, on the one hand, the anticipation of treatments due to the arrival
of information, and, on the other hand, the behavioral impact of knowing that there is a probability of a
future treatment. A range of empirical studies addresses the latter by way of a comparison to a regime where
treatments are known to be absent or to have a di®erent probability of occurrence. Black et al. (2003) show
that unemployed individuals less often enter an unemployment insurance spell if they learn that this includes
compulsory job search assistance. The \threat e®ect" of compulsory programs has also been found in Danish
data by Geerdsen (2006), using policy changes in the duration of bene¯ts for identi¯cation, and by Rosholm
and Svarer (2008). Van den Berg, Bergemann and Caliendo (2009, 2010) show that newly unemployed
workers in Germany have widely di®erent expectations on the probability of future participation in active
labor market policies, including training programs, and that this is re°ected in their job search behavior as
captured by search e®ort and the reservation wage.
5The outline of this paper is as follows: section 2 gives a formal presentation of the NA
assumption, describes our model, the e®ects of noti¯cation and treatment, and discusses iden-
ti¯cation. Section 3 presents the institutional French setting, the noti¯cation and training
processes, our administrative data, and the econometric speci¯cation we use for estimation.
All the results are in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
2.1 The role of the \no-anticipation" assumption in treatment
evaluation
We want to evaluate the e®ect of a treatment on the duration an individual spends in a
state of interest. The treatment can be assigned at di®erent points in time. We let Z denote
the duration before treatment and Y the duration in the state of interest (also called the
outcome). In our empirical application, Y will be the duration in unemployment and Z the
duration before the unemployed job seeker enters a training program. The evaluation of




, where Y (z) is the potential
duration when treatment is received at date t = z.5 Two obstacles stand in the way of
identifying the z 7! Y (z) functions. First, we observe Y (Z) but do not know anything about
Y (z);z 6= Z. This means that if an individual has received treatment after, say, 6 months,
we cannot predict what would have happened had he received treatment after 1 month , 3
months, 12 months, etc... This is the standard issue of selection into treatment (see Rubin,
1974), which can be overcome by using a relevant set of individual characteristics to write
an unconfoundability assumption.
The second issue is related to the dynamic nature of the problem: Z is censored by
Y i.e. if the individual leaves the state of interest before receiving treatment, we do not
observe Z, we just know that Z > Y . This poses a fundamental problem as, if Z > Y , we
no longer know which process among fY (z)gz>Y corresponds to the observed duration Y .
This hampers identi¯cation of a causal model unless we put some structure on the missing
part of the data. Abbring and Van den Berg (2003a) show that it is necessary to assume
that the outcome follows a single process before treatment occurs. This \no-anticipation"
assumption can be formally written as follows:6
Pr(Y (z) = t) = Pr(Y (z
0) = t); 8t · min(z;z
0): (1)
5To simplify the presentation, we assume that the individual enters the state of interest at date t = 0.
6The NA assumption should be made conditional on the set of confounders used to solve the ¯rst identi-
¯cation issue. For expositional convenience, we do not write this conditioning in this subsection.
6This assumption means that two individuals, say i and j, who are not yet treated at date t
have the same probability of leaving the state of interest at date t (and anytime before t).
This should be true even if t = 99 days, Zi = 100 days and Zj =1 000 days i.e. the fact that
i is going to be treated tomorrow does not make him more likely to leave today than j, who
will be treated in more than two years. The NA assumption is violated if individuals receive
information shocks before being treated and act on this new information. For instance, if i
knows that he will be treated tomorrow and consequently stops searching for jobs, his hazard
rate will di®er from that of j. The main purpose of this paper is to test the NA assumption,
using treatment noti¯cation dates as information shocks.
Before introducing noti¯cation dates, we brie°y present the Timing of Events (ToE here-
after) framework which has become standard in the evaluation of dynamic treatments. The
NA assumption coupled with an unconfoundability assumption are necessary to identify the
model. If the latter assumption involves unobserved confounders, we also need to make a
parametric assumption on the hazard rates of Z and Y in order to identify the distribution
















where X is a vector of observed characteristics, e V =
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rate of Y , conditional on individual heterogeneity and on the treatment date. The distribu-
tion of e V , denoted as e G(¢), is assumed to be independent of X. Using standard identi¯cation
results from the competing risks literature (see Abbring and Van den Berg, 2003b) one can
identify the e ¸'s, the e Á's and e G from data on min(Z;Y ) and IfY < Zg. Then, the variation
of the hazard rate of Y around the treatment date identi¯es the treatment e®ect e ±. Note that
the dummy 1fZ < tg in the hazard rate of Y ensures that the NA assumption is satis¯ed.
2.2 A duration model with noti¯cation dates
We here extend the standard evaluation model (2). Assuming that an individual enters the
state of interest at date t = 0, we denote as P the duration until he receives some information
about his future entry into treatment. We denote as Z(p) the duration elapsed before the
individual is treated, if he is noti¯ed at date t = p. Lastly, let Y (z;p) be the time spent in
the state of interest if the individual is treated at date t = z and receives a noti¯cation at
7date t = p. The durations Z(p) and Y (z;p), (z;p) 2 (R¤+)
2 are potential random duration
variables. We assume that (P;Z;Y ) is ruled by the following MPH model:
hP(tjX;V ) = ¸P(t)ÁP(X)VP; (3)
hZ(tjP;X;V ) = ¸Z(t)ÁZ(X)VZ [°P(t;P;X)]
1fP<tg ;





where hA(¢jB) is the hazard rate of A conditionally on B, X is a vector of observed individual
characteristics and V = (VP;VZ;VY) is a vector of unobserved individual characteristics. We
assume that V is a vector in (R¤+)
3, independent of X and with distribution G. It is
important to mention that the functions ¸Z, ¸Y, ÁZ, ÁZ and G are not the same as those
in the standard model (2). The set of functions (°P;±P;±Z;±PZ) describes the e®ects of
noti¯cation and treatment on the durations. We will comment on these e®ects in the next
subsection. We add to model (3) a series of technical assumptions about continuity of the
Á functions and about integrability of the ¸, ° and ± functions (as well as cross products of
these functions). We present these assumptions in Appendix A. From now on, any reference
to model (3) will include this set of technical assumptions.7
We should mention that model (3) implies a speci¯c noti¯cation procedure that might not
be suitable for all applications. The main two features are: i) one could receive a treatment
without having been previously noti¯ed (Z can be lower than P) and ii) the date of start of
the treatment is still random once noti¯cation has been received (the distribution of Z is not
degenerate if Z > P). These two characteristics of our model are introduced in prevision of
our empirical application. One could also think of an alternative model in which noti¯cation
necessarily comes before treatment and the date of treatment is deterministic conditionally
on the noti¯cation date.
Model (3) satis¯es two assumptions that are important for identi¯cation. First, uncon-
foundedness (CIA thereafter, for conditional independence assumption) states that within
speci¯ed groups of individuals, treatment is assigned independently of potential outcomes.
In model (3), we assume that Y (z;p)?(Z;P) and Z(p)?P conditionally on X and V .
Secondly, we need to adapt the NA assumption to our setting. The prescription P can
have an e®ect on Z and Y while the actual treatment Z can have an e®ect only on Y .8 Model
7The event-history model derived by Abbring (2008) would also be relevant to study transitions between
our ¯ve states of interest (neither noti¯ed nor treated, noti¯ed and not treated, treated and not noti¯ed,
noti¯ed and treated, and out). The modeling of the e®ects of noti¯cation and treatment would be slightly
di®erent though.
8For conciseness, we will refer to the e®ect of noti¯cation on (duration before) training as the e®ect of P
on Z. Likewise, the e®ect of training on unemployment duration will be referred to as the e®ect of Z on Y ,
etc.
8(3) implies that these \treatments" start having an e®ect on the \outcome" only from the
date of their realization:
Pr(Z(p) = t) = Pr(Z(p
0) = t); 8t · min(p;p
0); (4)
Pr(Y (z;p) = t) = Pr(Y (z;p
0) = t); 8t · min(p;p
0) < z;
Pr(Y (z;p) = t) = Pr(Y (z
0;p) = t); 8t · min(z;z
0) < p;
Pr(Y (z;p) = t) = Pr(Y (z
0;p) = t); 8p < t · min(z;z
0);
where we have dropped the conditioning on X and V for notational convenience. The ¯rst
equality will allow us to identify the e®ect of P on Z. The second and third equalities pertain
to the e®ect of P on Y and Z on Y respectively. The last equality will allow identi¯cation
of the joint e®ect of P and Z on Y . Identi¯cation will be discussed in subsection 2.4.
To avoid confusion, we will not refer to (4) as no anticipation assumptions even though
these equalities restrict the information available to individuals. For instance, the standard
NA assumption discussed in section 2.1 states that no private information shocks is used
by individuals before they start the treatment Z. Our model (3) allows for such a shock,
through P, but we need to impose that noti¯cation is the only source of information prior
to the treatment.
2.3 Three issues arising from noti¯cation
The main purpose of the present paper is to study whether noti¯cation shocks act as private
signals that may violate the standard NA assumption. In addition to the study of anticipation
of treatment by individuals, we want to know if the treatment e®ect depends on whether
the individual has received a prescription or not. If this is the case then the standard
framework of AVdB (2) no longer applies as the treatment e®ect ± depends on a time-varying
unobserved variable (noti¯cation status). The next three paragraphs address speci¯c issues
related to noti¯cation and/or anticipation and point at potential biases in the estimation
of the treatment e®ect when one overlooks, or has no information on, noti¯cation. The
tests that are consequently suggested are based on the set of \treatment e®ect" functions
(°P;±P;±Z;±PZ).
Does noti¯cation have a direct e®ect on the outcome of interest? The main
implication of the NA assumption is that before entering a treatment, individuals do not
receive information shocks at random dates that will a®ect their propensity to leave the
state of interest. However, if not yet treated individuals receive some information about
their future participation in the treatment and act on this information, the NA assumption
9is violated. Note that the information does not need to be the actual date when an individual
will be treated, it can just consist in some indication that the individual is more or less likely
to receive the treatment at any date in the future. What is important is that individuals'
information about their future treatment status can change over time, and that individuals
can act on these information shocks.
We consider that noti¯cation can be seen as an information shock that could a®ect the
individual's main duration outcome prior to treatment. It is clear from model (3) that
noti¯cation has a direct e®ect on the outcome of interest if and only if ±P(t;p;X) 6= 1. One
of our main empirical goals will thus be to test whether ±P(t;p;X) is di®erent from 1.
Does the treatment e®ect depend on noti¯cation? In theory, the model (2) allows
for the treatment e®ect e ±Z to depend on the treatment date, the time elapsed since treatment
and individual observed characteristics X. AVdB also show that one can identify a treat-
ment e®ect that depends on unobservable characteristics, provided these characteristics can
only change at the treatment date. However, if the e®ect of the treatment di®ers whether
individuals have received a prescription or not, and if the noti¯cation date is not available or
overlooked, the treatment e®ect depends on an unobservable variable that changes through
time, strictly before the treatment date. In that case, model (2) no longer allows for enough
°exibility in the treatment e®ect. We can check empirically whether the treatment e®ect
depends on the individual's noti¯cation status at the treatment date by testing the following
equality ±Z(t;z;X) = ±PZ(t;z;p;X).
Does noti¯cation have a direct e®ect on the treatment date? If individuals who
receive noti¯cation are more likely to be treated, there is an unobserved heterogeneity term
(the noti¯cation date P) that is unaccounted for in model (2). Therefore the MPH spec-
i¯cation in (2) might be inconsistent with the true hazard rate of Z. We can check this
by testing whether °P is di®erent from 1. This issue is not directly related to anticipation
behavior and is perhaps of a lesser methodological interest than the two e®ects discussed
above. Yet, °P can be of considerable interest to policy makers as its sign and magnitude
convey a lot of information on the e±ciency of the treatment assignment process.
2.4 Identi¯cation
We always observe X and Y , although the latter can be censored by the sampling date.9
However, we face the standard selectivity issue as we observe Z only for those who receive the
treatment before leaving the state of interest, i.e. those who have Z < Y . If an individual
9This censoring a®ects few observations in our empirical application.
10leaves before having been treated, we only know that Z ¸ Y . Likewise, we observe P if
and only if P < min(Z;Y ). If an individual starts treatment or leaves the state of interest
without having received noti¯cation, we only know that P ¸ min(Z;Y ). Formally, for any
(p;z;y) 2 (R¤+)
3 we can compute the four following probabilities:
QY(y) = Pr(Y > y;Y < min(P,Z)); (5)
QZ(z;y) = Pr(Y > y;Z > z;Z < min(P;Y ));
QP(p;y) = Pr(Y > y;P > p;Z > Y > P);
QPZ(p;z;y) = Pr(Y > y;Z > z;P > p;Y > Z > P):
These probabilities are conditional on X, we drop the conditioning for notational conve-
nience. We denote Q(p;z;y) =
¡
QY(y); QZ(z;y); QP(p;y); QPZ(p;z;y)
¢






as \the data". We also de¯ne two subsets of data
that will prove relevant for identi¯cation. The ¯rst one consists of the minimum of (P;Z;Y )
and of an indicator telling which of these three processes is the shortest. Formally, we










. The subset Q0 thus provides the duration up
to the ¯rst event as well as the nature of this event (noti¯cation, treatment or exit from
the state of interest). The second subset of interest consists of P (unless censored), the











. The only di®erence between Q and Q1 is that in the latter, Y is censored
by Z i.e. we no longer follow individuals once they have received the treatment. We can
now give three identi¯cation results. 10
The ¯rst one is taken from Abbring and Van den Berg (2003b) and states that we can
identify model (3), except the e®ect of noti¯cation or treatment, on the minimum of the
three processes:
Proposition 1. [Abbring and Van den Berg (2003b)] The functions (¸P;¸Z;¸Y;ÁP;ÁZ;ÁY;G)
from model (3) are identi¯ed from Q0.
This proposition shows that the \competing risks" part of the model allows identi¯cation
of the three hazard rates, except their link arising through noti¯cation and/or treatment.
We still need to recover the e®ect of P on Y , of P on Z, of Z on Y if Z · P and of Z on
Y if P < Z. To this end, we need to use the remaining data and look at the change in the
hazard rate of the outcomes around the date of noti¯cation and the date of treatment. We
10See Abbring (2008) for the identi¯cation of an event-history model in a similar vein.
11can do this in two steps. First, we consider the subset of data Q1 and focus on the e®ects of
P on Z and on Y . We have the following result:
Proposition 2. The functions (¸P;¸Z;¸Y;ÁP;ÁZ;ÁY;G;°P;±P) from model (3) are identi-
¯ed from Q1.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Proposition 2 states that the variations of the hazard rates of Z and Y around the
noti¯cation date are enough to identify the e®ect of noti¯cation. This result is important
from an empirical perspective as it will allow us to estimate the e®ect of noti¯cation without
making assumptions about the ±Z and ±PZ functions i.e. about the e®ect of Z on Y . Indeed,
while in theory we can identify treatment e®ects as °exible functions, in practice we have to
impose some structure on the treatment e®ects for the estimation to be feasible. Proposition
2 thus shows that an estimation of the e®ects of noti¯cation and thus, according to subsection
2.3, the test of the NA assumption do not rely on a given speci¯cation for the e®ects of Z
on Y . The model identi¯ed from Proposition 2 will be referred to as the partial-information
model.
While the test of the NA assumption is the main purpose of this paper, we also want to
evaluate the e®ect of the treatment Z. To this end, we need to consider the whole data and
identify all the functions from model (3). We thus need the last identi¯cation result:
Proposition 3. The model (3) is identi¯ed from the data Q.
Proof: See Appendix B.
As it was the case for the identi¯cation of °P and ±P in Proposition 2, Proposition 3 states
that we can identify the e®ects of Z, i.e. the functions ±Z and ±PZ by using the variation of
the hazard rate of Y around Z when Z · P and P < Z respectively.
3 Empirical application: training programs for unem-
ployed workers in France
3.1 Training programs and noti¯cation procedures in France
In this subsection we present the assignment process to training and the nature of the
information shock individuals receive when they are noti¯ed. It appears that the institutional
setting of the French training system is a source of variation for P and Z in our econometric
model. We also give some insight on the content of training programs.
12Noti¯cation: the nature of the \information shock". In France, entry into a training
program may result from a proposal by the public employment service (Agence Nationale
Pour l'Emploi, ANPE hereafter) or from the job seeker's own initiative. The PARE (Plan
d'Aide au Retour a l'Emploi) reform implemented in 2001 improved individual counseling
services. Since then, a meeting with an ANPE caseworker (typically 30 minutes long) is
compulsory for all newly registered unemployed workers and recurs at least every 6 months.
Depending on the individual's pro¯le, the caseworker can schedule follow-up interviews be-
tween two compulsory meetings, and interviews can be requested at any moment by the
unemployed workers themselves. Apart from a wide range of counseling measures, training
programs may be proposed to job seekers during these interviews. This allows us to charac-
terize noti¯cation in our econometric model. More precisely, noti¯cation is reported when an
ANPE caseworker informs the job seeker that he should enter a training program and that he
is to be put in relation with a (private or public) training provider.11 In theory, noti¯cation
should be given during, or shortly after, the second meeting with the caseworker (usually 6
months after registration). In practice, it can also occur during another meeting, or even
by phone or (e-)mail. Hence noti¯cation can occur very early in the unemployment spell or
much later, depending on the timing of interviews, but also on the discussions between the
caseworker and the job seeker. In the framework of our econometric model, this can be seen
as a source of variation in P, which will be supported by descriptive statistics in the next
subsection.
From noti¯cation to training. When a job seeker is noti¯ed, he may not immediately,
nor systematically, enter a training program. In theory, job seekers are free to accept or
turn down any program they are proposed, but a refusal can lead to a cut in unemployment
bene¯ts. In practice, however, sanctions for refusing a training program are almost never
taken.12 Hence, noti¯cation implies no compulsory training action. This makes the French
institutional setting very di®erent from other systems where sanctions for a refusal of training
are much more likely to occur.13 Moreover, even if the job seeker is willing to be trained,
¯nding a suitable program can take time. This is due to the lack of available training slots
or to the time an individual needs to ¯nd a funding for his/her training program. Finally,
despite recent reforms, the French training system remains complex14 so noti¯cation is only
11It could be that the caseworker contacts the training provider on behalf of the job seeker or that he gives
the job seeker the contact details of the training provider.
12Note that job seekers not eligible to unemployment bene¯ts (roughly 50% of the stock) are not concerned
by sanctions.
13See, e.g., the description of the Danish system in Rosholm and Svarer (2008).
14One of the main feature of the system is that it is run and funded by three di®erent agents: the state,
the social partners and the administrative regions. See, Cr¶ epon et al. (2007) for a more precise description
13the ¯rst step in a long and possibly di±cult procedure. In the next subsection we show that
there is indeed a lot of variation in the duration between noti¯cation and treatment.
Noti¯cation and contents of training programs. Participation in a training program
may or may not be preceded by noti¯cation from a caseworker. In the latter case, it could
be that the job seeker found a training program on his own and then asked the caseworker
to authorize it. There may thus be heterogeneity in the treatment e®ects with respect to
who initiated training. It is not clear a priori how these two e®ects may di®er. On the one
hand, the job seeker has a better knowledge of his own skills, motivation and job experience
but on the other hand, the caseworker has more information on the local labor market. For
instance, since the PARE reform, ANPE caseworkers have access to detailed information
on local labor demand and have been instructed to assign job seekers to training actions
suited to the open vacancies (see Ferracci et al., 2010). Ideally, we would like to control
for the actual content of training programs. This would allow us to interpret a di®erence
between ±Z and ±PZ as the e®ect of the counseling e®ort of the caseworker. Unfortunately,
this information is not available in our data so we shall work with a general de¯nition of
training programs, controlling for the noti¯cation status of the job seeker.15
3.2 Data and descriptive statistics
The data set. Our data come from the Fichier Historique Statistique (FHS thereafter),
an exhaustive register of all unemployed spells recorded at the ANPE. We use data on 10%
of individuals in the greater Paris region (Ile-de-France). We consider all unemployment
spells starting in 2003 or 2004 and follow them up to their end or to the 1st of January 2008,
which is the date when the data was extracted (very few spells last until then). For each
spell we observe the starting and ending16 dates (unless censored by the extraction date),
an individual identi¯er and some characteristics of the job seeker (which we detail below).
If an unemployment spell includes a period during which the individual follows a training
of the system.
15Additional data provided by the unemployment insurance agency (UNEDIC) make it possible to describe
the content of training programs with some precision. Due to the lack of common identi¯ers, we cannot merge
this additional data set with the one we use in this paper. This data set sorts training programs into four
groups, according to the type of training: \general" (e.g. mathematics, economics, languages), \personal"
(e.g. development of mental abilities, development of professional organization capacities), \service oriented
vocational skills" (e.g. accounting, hotel business) and \production oriented vocational skills" (e.g carpentry,
engineering). While the distribution across types is not uniform, the mass is not concentrated on a single
type. For instance, out of the 593 126 programs that took place between 2005 and 2007, 17.9% were of the
\general" type, 37.5% of the \personal" type, 29.9% were \service oriented" and 14.7% were \production
oriented".
16An unemployment spell ends when the individual leaves the register of the ANPE which means either
that he has found a job or that he has stopped looking for one.
14program, we observe the dates when he enters and leaves this program. Importantly, we also
know if and when the caseworker informs the job seeker of the action taken regarding his
job search, and whether this involves taking steps towards a training program. As explained
in the previous section, we consider that a job seeker has received noti¯cation of a future
treatment when he is informed by the caseworker of the start of a procedure that should
lead to a training program.
Description of the sample. We have N unemployment spells, each denoted by the




whether each duration of interest is censored or not. We observe the realized duration before
noti¯cation Pi if CP
i = 0 and we only know that this duration is longer than Pi if CP
i = 1.
We observe the realized duration before treatment Zi if CZ
i = 0 and we only know that this
duration is longer than Zi if CZ
i = 1. We observe the realized unemployment duration Yi if
CY
i = 0 and we only know that this duration is longer than Yi if CY
i = 1.
For each spell i, we observe some characteristics of the job seeker, which are denoted
by the vector Xi. These characteristics are the following: 1fmaleg, age, age2, exp, exp2
(where exp is the experience in the occupation of the job searched), 1fFrenchg, 1fmarriedg,
1fchildreng, dummies for quali¯cation (6 categories, the reference is \executive"), education
(6 categories, the reference is \university degree") and department of residence (8 depart-
ments, the reference is Paris).17 If ti0 is the date when the current spell starts, we also
compute the individual's number of unemployment spells and time spent unemployed over
the periods [ti0 ¡ 2 years;ti0[ and [ti0 ¡ 5 years;ti0 ¡ 2 years[. Lastly, we use some precise
information on the location of the unemployment agency to de¯ne an individual's local labor
market and then to compute two indicators. Let yi0 be the year when spell i starts and let ai
be the location of the unemployment agency. The ¯rst indicator gives the proportion of un-
employment spells in ai which started during yi0¡1 and saw training occur within one year.
The second indicator gives the relative variation in the yearly in°ow into unemployment for
area ai between years yi0 ¡ 1 and yi0.
Descriptive statistics. Our sample contains 159 599 unemployment spells, starting be-
tween the 1st of January 2003 and the 31st of December 2004. Only 2.61% of these spells
are censored by the data extraction date (1st of January 2008). For 16 852 unemployment
spells (10.6%), noti¯cation is received before the start of a training program or exit from
unemployment.
17Departments are administrative areas smaller than regions and larger than municipalities, There are 95
departments in metropolitan France, and 8 in the region we study. Only Paris is both a municipality and a
department.
15Table 1 gives the proportion of spells containing a noti¯cation or a training period (or
both) in the whole sample (¯rst column) as well as in populations of a given gender, age or
unemployment status during the two-year period preceding the current spell. We note that
relatively few individuals are noti¯ed or trained (around 10%), that the proportion of treated
is much greater among those who received a noti¯cation, and yet that many individuals enter
a training program without having received prior noti¯cation from the caseworker. This
latter feature can arise from heterogeneity in treatment as individuals might participate in
training programs that are not provided by the unemployment agency. Unfortunately, the
data do not allow us to observe the nature of the training programs. Yet, we will allow for
this possibility by letting the e®ect of training vary between individuals who were noti¯ed
and those who were not. Also, note that our modeling of the hazard rates for P and Z (see
section 2.2, equation (3)), is consistent with the statistics shown in Table 1, in particular
with Pr(Z < P) > 0.
Table 1: Probabilities of receiving noti¯cation and/or training
all sample male female age · 25 age ¸ 55 Xu2 > 0 Xu2 = 0
% noti¯ed 10.6 9.5 11.7 8.1 3.0 7.3 13.3
% treated 9.8 9.3 10.3 7.0 3.2 2.9 15.5
% treated if not noti¯ed 6.5 6.2 6.9 4.7 2.2 1.8 10.7
% treated if noti¯ed 37.4 38.7 36.4 33.8 38.3 16.2 47.1
Note: Xu2 is the time spent unemployed in the two years preceding the start of the current spell.
Table 2 shows the average and a series of quantiles for the main durations of interest.
We see that unemployment spells can be very long, with an average of almost one year
(E(Y ) = 342 days). Individuals who receive noti¯cation do so on average after 6 months,
which is consistent with the interview process introduced by the PARE reform. Note though
that there is variation in the date when noti¯cation is given. There is also a lot of variation
in the starting date of training programs, with an average at around 8 months (247 days).
For those who were given noti¯cation and actually started a training program, the interval
between these two events is shorter than 3 months on average.
Unemployment duration seems to be a®ected by both training and noti¯cation. Indeed,
we note that the average of Y is much smaller among individuals who did not participate
in a training program than among those who did. Individuals who were neither noti¯ed nor
16treated also experience shorter unemployment spells than those who received noti¯cation
(but no treatment). However, these numbers can be driven by observed and unobserved
heterogeneity so we turn to our econometric model for a more detailed analysis of the e®ects
of noti¯cation and training.
Table 2: Distribution of some durations of interest (in days)
Mean Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90
P if noti¯ed 181 9 28 107 250 454
Z if treated 247 46 98 196 350 526
Z if treated and not noti¯ed 236 35 88 182 336 515
Z if treated and noti¯ed 263 63 117 217 369 539
Z ¡ P if treated and noti¯ed 82 5 13 43 98 209
Y 342 29 68 211 495 865
Y if not noti¯ed and not treated 292 26 54 168 386 780
Y if noti¯ed and not treated 513 89 207 403 753 1120
Y ¡ P if noti¯ed and not treated 331 38 98 225 468 782
Y if treated 657 264 402 641 853 1088
Y if not treated 308 27 59 182 415 808
Y if treated and not noti¯ed 648 251 391 629 853 1085
Y if treated and noti¯ed 670 285 423 657 852 1090
3.3 Econometric speci¯cation and estimation procedure
The duration model. We use the KP-quantiles of P conditionally on CP = 0 as cut-o®
points for the piece-wise constant part of the hazard rate in (3). This introduces KP ¡ 1
parameters to estimate for ¸P as, for normalization, we ¯x the probability on the ¯rst interval,
¸P1, to be .001. We proceed similarly for ¸Z and ¸Y (except that we do not condition on
CY = 0 for the latter), with ¸Z1 = :002 and ¸Y 1 = :004. We set KP = KZ = KY = 11. The
30 parameters thus introduced are stacked in the vector ¤. The Á functions in (3) are speci¯ed
as log-linear functions: ÁP(X) = exp(X0¯P), ÁZ(X) = exp(X0¯Z) and ÁY(X) = exp(X0¯Y).
Treatment e®ects. We allow the treatment e®ects to vary with time as follows:
°P(t;P;X) = °
0
P ¢ 1ft · P + 92g + °
3
P ¢ 1ft > P + 92g; (6)
±P(t;P;X) = ±
0
P ¢ 1ft · P + 183g + ±
6
P ¢ 1ft > P + 183g;
±Z(t;Z;X) = ±
0
Z ¢ 1ft · Z + 123g + ±
4
Z ¢ 1fZ + 123 < t · Z + 365g + ±
12
Z ¢ 1fZ + 365 < tg;
±PZ(t;Z;P;X) = ±
0
PZ ¢ 1ft · Z + 123g + ±
4
PZ ¢ 1fZ + 123 < t · Z + 365g + ±
12
PZ ¢ 1fZ + 365 < tg:
17Since durations are in days, equation (6) means that we allow for the e®ect of noti¯cation
on treatment participation (resp. on exit from unemployment) to change after 3 months
(resp. 6 months). Likewise, the e®ect of training on unemployment duration (whether it
was preceded by noti¯cation of not) is allowed to change after 4 months and after a year.
This latter feature aims at capturing a locking-in e®ect for training programs (i.e. workers
spending less time on job search while being treated). The dates used in this speci¯cation
of treatment e®ects are motivated by the descriptive statistics on durations in the previous
subsection.
The distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. The distribution of unobserved het-
erogeneity G is assumed to have a discrete support with a given number R of mass points.
More precisely Pr(V = exp(vr)) = pr, 8r 2 [1;R] , where vr 2 (R¤+)







; ®R = 0 and ®r 2 R if r < R:
Note that this speci¯cation of unobserved heterogeneity is more °exible than the one usually
encountered in empirical applications of the ToE approach (e.g. Van den Berg, Van der
Klaauw and Van Ours, 2004, or Lalive et al., 2005) which assume that each component of
the V vector can take a given number of values (often two) and then form groups as pairs
(if there are two processes, triplets if there are three, etc...) of these values. The approach
we retain here, and which we borrow from the statistical literature (see e.g. Aitkin, 1999),
is more °exible and more suitable to cases like ours where there are more than two duration
processes (as the number of parameters to estimate increases more slowly when we account
for more groups). We should mention though than in theory, if we can increase the number
of groups to in¯nity, the two methods are similar.18











¯P, ¯Z, ¯Y and fpr;vrgr2[1;R] in the vector £(R). The contribution to the likelihood of spell























18The paper by Cr¶ epon et al. (2007) considers a factor-loading model for unobserved heterogeneity, which
imposes more structure on the data but is equivalent to our method if the number of factors becomes large
(which is hard to realize in practice).
18where the hazard rates hP, hZ and hY are given by (3) and SP, SZ and SY denote the corre-
























Our benchmark estimation sets the number of groups of unobserved heterogeneity R to 4,
as further increases in R did not increase the likelihood.
The partial-information likelihood. As shown in Proposition 2, we can identify all the
determinants of model (3) except the two functions ±Z and ±PZ using data in which Y is
censored by Z. We can thus estimate the main e®ect of interest, ±P, without specifying the
±Z and ±PZ functions. Our test of the NA assumption will not depend on a speci¯c modeling
of the e®ect of training. We can thus consider the subset of data in which Yi = Zi and
CY
i = 1 if CZ
i = 0. The corresponding partial-information likelihood is similar to (8) except
that (±Z;±PZ) are no longer in the vector of parameters. The maximization procedure is
similar to the one outlined above.
4 Estimation results
The ¯rst subsection focuses on the e®ect of noti¯cation on unemployment duration and on
participation in training programs. The second subsection shows the estimates of the treat-
ment e®ects. It also draws comparisons with results obtained from standard ToE models,
either overlooking noti¯cation (i.e. just looking at the e®ect of Z on Y ) or assuming that
the actual treatment starts when noti¯cation is given (i.e. looking at the e®ect of min(P;Z)
on Y ). For these two sections, we will consider the logarithms of the ± and ° parameters, so
that a given e®ect is said to be negative (resp. null, resp. positive) when the corresponding
log-parameter is smaller than (resp. equal to, resp. greater than) 0. The next three sub-
sections present additional results on the role of time dependence, observed and unobserved
heterogeneity in the three processes at play. These results are interesting as they shed light
on the noti¯cation process which, as far as we know, has not yet been studied on such a
large scale.
4.1 The e®ect of noti¯cation on exit from unemployment and
treatment participation
The e®ect of noti¯cation on unemployment: a test of the no-anticipation as-
sumption. Table 3 presents the estimates of ln±P, using the speci¯cation (6). First, note
19that the estimates from the partial- and full-information models are close, as they should be
(cf. Proposition 2). Since the partial-information model puts no constraints on ±Z and ±PZ,
we can thus conclude that the speci¯cation used for these two e®ects in the full-information
model does not impact the estimation of ±P.
The main result of this paper is that noti¯cation signi¯cantly decreases the unemployment
hazard rate. We can see in Table 3 that the e®ect of noti¯cation on hY is signi¯cantly
negative, at -.4, in the ¯rst six months and not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero thereafter.
Therefore, in our data, the assumption that workers do not anticipate training is violated.
The main consequence from a methodological point of view is that we can no longer interpret
the treatment parameter e ±Z in the standard ToE model (2) as a causal treatment e®ect.
Indeed, the distribution of the counterfactual duration E(Y jY < Z) is not unique, it depends
on an unobserved, time-varying, characteristic: the date of noti¯cation P.
Let us now discuss the economic implications of the estimates shown in Table 3. Since
ln±P remains signi¯cantly below 0 during the ¯rst semester following noti¯cation, our results
rule out a \threat e®ect" of noti¯cation (see, e.g., Black et al., 2003). If workers who are
noti¯ed then face sanctions for not participating in a training program, they might leave
unemployment for a job that they would not have accepted otherwise. This job may indeed
o®er a better alternative to entering a training program or facing sanctions for not doing so.
We do not ¯nd such an e®ect in our data as workers are less likely to leave unemployment once
they receive noti¯cation of a future treatment. There are two potential causes. First, workers
could actually want to participate in a training program and thus stop their job search in
the weeks prior to the beginning of the program, leading to a decrease in the arrival rate of
job o®ers. Second, the noti¯cation can increase a worker's reservation value as it gives him
another alternative to compare job o®ers with. Since, in practice, sanctions against those
shunning away from training are almost never implemented, this training opportunity only
makes workers more selective when considering job o®ers. We cannot assess which of these
two e®ects drives our results. Yet, Table 3 clearly indicates that the NA assumption does
not hold because workers who receive noti¯cation prior to training experience a signi¯cant
decrease in their probability to leave unemployment.
20Table 3: E®ects of noti¯cation on unemployment duration (ln±P)









Note that the decrease in the hazard rate only takes place in the ¯rst six months following
noti¯cation, after which ln±P goes from -.4 to 0. As Table 2 showed, 75% (resp. 90%) of
individuals who are both noti¯ed and treated enter a training program within 92 days (resp.
209 days) following noti¯cation. We can thus expect noti¯cation to have a small e®ect on the
unemployment hazard rate after six months. Table 3 con¯rms this intuition as ±P is no longer
signi¯cantly di®erent from 1. Noti¯cation thus seems to \lock" workers in unemployment
only on the short term.
The e®ect of noti¯cation on treatment participation. Table 4 shows the estimates
of ln°P from both the partial- and full-information models. As it was the case for ±P, the
estimates are very close so our speci¯cation of the e®ects of training in the full-information
model does not a®ect the estimation of °P. The main result from Table 4 is that noti¯cation
has a huge e®ect on the probability to enter a training program. This was expected given the
descriptive statistics in Table 1, which re°ected the setting of training programs in France. If
a job seeker is o®ered a training program, he will be noti¯ed by the caseworker before entering
the program. The reasons why there is not a one-to-one relation between noti¯cation and
treatment status are twofold. First, workers can leave unemployment between noti¯cation
and training. This might be due not only to a \threat-e®ect" of training but also to some
ine±ciencies in the assignment to treatment as workers may have to wait before a suitable
training position opens (see Fleuret, 2006). Second, workers can ¯nd a training program
which is not preceded by a noti¯cation from the caseworker. Still, the results from Table 4
show that the probability to enter a training program is much higher once an individual has
received a noti¯cation. We note that the hazard rate of Z increases dramatically during the
three months following noti¯cation and then decreases but remains at a level much higher
than before noti¯cation.
21Table 4: E®ects of noti¯cation on treatment participation (ln°P)









As we discussed in section 2.2, while °P might be of interest to policy makers who want
to assess the e±ciency of the assignment process, it is less important than the ±'s parameters
from a methodological point of view. Still, if one uses the standard ToE model (2) with no
information on noti¯cation, the jump in the hazard rate of Z shown in Table 4 at the time of
noti¯cation will not be accounted for. There will thus be a bias due to some time-dependent
unobserved heterogeneity. In other words, even if the no-anticipation held (which is not the
case in our data), the fact that ln°P is signi¯cantly di®erent from 0 would create a bias in
the estimation of the treatment e®ect.
4.2 The e®ect of training programs on unemployment duration,
with and without noti¯cation
Table 5 shows our estimates for the e®ects of training on exit from unemployment. The ¯rst
row corresponds to training programs that were not preceded by noti¯cation. We see that the
e®ect on exit from unemployment is negative in the ¯rst four months, slightly positive in the
eight following months and increases further after a year. These results are consistent with
the already existing evidence (see, e.g., Lechner et al., 2004) showing that training programs
have a strong locking-in e®ect followed by a null or slight increase in the probability to leave
unemployment. This increase appears mostly a year after entry into a training program.
Since training programs not preceded by noti¯cation start on average eight months after
the beginning of an unemployment spell (see Table 2), these programs have a small impact
on unemployment duration and none (perhaps even a positive one) on the probability of
becoming long-term unemployed.19
19We should mention that while training programs seem to lenghthen unemployment spells, it has also
been found (see Cr¶ epon et al., 2007) that they have a positive impact on the length of the subsequent
employment spell.
22Table 5: Treatment e®ects without (ln±Z) and with (ln±PZ) noti¯cation













Looking at the second row of Table 5, we note that the results are di®erent for training
programs with a noti¯cation from the caseworker. The main di®erence is that ±PZ is always
smaller than ±Z. The locking-in e®ect during the ¯rst four months is stronger (-1.17 against
-.775) and the e®ect between four and eight months is small but now signi¯cantly negative
(-.129 against .125). The e®ect after a year is positive but smaller than ±Z. The di®erences
between ±Z and ±PZ may arise from di®erent sources. First, it could be that the training
programs are di®erent with respect to their content or their intensity (half-time/full-time).20
We cannot investigate further this issue for lack of data on the content of programs or of
a more °exible speci¯cation. The treatment e®ects may also di®er if noti¯cation triggers a
behavioral reponse from the job seeker when he starts the training program.21 In any case,
the estimates in Table 5 show that noti¯cation is a relevant feature for the evaluation of
training programs as the treatment e®ect depends signi¯cantly (and negatively) on whether
an individual received noti¯cation.
We now compare our estimates of the treatment e®ect with those from the standard ToE
model. The ¯rst row of Table 6 shows the estimate of lne ±Z obtained using model (2) with
a speci¯cation similar to that retained for our benchmark model (3). Note that with model
(2), there is a single treatment e®ect, denoted as e ±Z, while model (3) allows for two treatment
e®ects: with and without noti¯cation. Looking at the point estimates, we note that e ±Z is
between ±Z and ±PZ when t ¡ Z · 123 days. Then lne ±Z is above ln±Z (and thus ln±PZ)
between the 4th and 12th months that follow Z, and even more so after that (.503 against
.372). Hence the treatment e®ect tends to be overestimated after 4 months, and especially
after a year, when overlooking noti¯cation. While the two models lead to qualitatively similar
20While we do not observe the content of training programs, we know when each program starts and ends
so we can compute its duration. The distribution of these durations barely changes when looking at programs
with or without noti¯cation. The average and median are respectively 136 and 102 days with noti¯cation
and 132 and 95 days without noti¯cation.
21The di®erences between ±Z and ±PZ may also be due to a misspeci¯cation of the model. Individuals
who go directly into training (without receiving noti¯cation) may di®er from those who receive noti¯cation
in a way that is not captured by V in our MPH model.
23estimates, we should not conclude that one can ignore noti¯cation when evaluating a given
treatment. First, the violation of the no-anticipation assumption means that the estimates
from the ToE model cannot be interpreted as a treatment e®ect because the counter-factual
is ill-de¯ned. In particular, the estimates shown in Table 6 are based on a model that
is rejected by the data. Second, Table 5 shows that there may be heterogeneity between
training programs so the estimates from the ToE model leads to some average e®ect and
overlooks the selection between each types of program. Lastly, the long-run e®ect of training
programs are overestimated when using model (2).

















The second row of Table 6 shows the estimate of the standard ToE model (2) when setting
the treatment date to the minimum of the noti¯cation date P and the training date Z. This
speci¯cation is sometimes suggested (for instance in AVdB) as a way to de¯ne the treatment
in the presence of information shocks. We note that the locking-in e®ect during the ¯rst four
months is weaker than in Table 5 (i.e. lne ±Z is closer to 0). Also, the e®ect between 4 and 12
months is now insigni¯cant. However, we note that this speci¯cation pushes the bias in the
long-term treatment e®ect downwards (.307 against .503). Overall, it is di±cult to interpret
this treatment e®ect, as it is a compound of two e®ects (noti¯cation and training), and it
shows no straightforward relation with the actual training e®ects estimated in Table 5.
4.3 Time dependence
We now look at the estimates of the ¸ functions, which, together with the treatment param-
eters, are the only source of time dependence in model (3). Figure 1 shows these functions
for each duration of interest. When looking at these graphs, remember that we had to set
the probability on the ¯rst interval for each process so these results are only qualitative.
Remember also that the cut-o® points have been set in order to match the deciles of P
(conditionally on receiving noti¯cation), Z (conditionally on being treated) and Y .
24Figure 1: Time-dependent components of hazard rates (t in days)
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We note that workers are more likely to receive noti¯cation upon entering unemployment
and also after about 200 days. These results are consistent with the timing of interviews as
job seekers have to meet with a caseworker at the beginning of the unemployment spell and
about six months later. The piecewise constant component of hZ is low during the ¯rst weeks
but increases steadily to reach a maximum after about 200 days, which is the period with the
closest monitoring of job seekers. After this peak, ¸Z stays almost constant up to 550 days
and then slumps so that almost no one is treated after 18 months of unemployment. Lastly,
the hazard rate out of unemployment also depends on time as ¸Y shows a peak after about
a month of unemployment. This non-stationarity in the probability to leave unemployment
arises from worker reallocation between jobs through very short unemployment spells (see
Fougµ ere, 2000). After another albeit much smaller peak at 200 days, ¸Y shows a steady
decline until t ¼ 650 days where it jumps to much higher values. This could re°ect the end
of unemployment bene¯ts (usually after 23 months of unemployment).
4.4 Observed heterogeneity
We now present the estimates for the e®ects of observed characteristics on the three hazard
rates. Table 7 shows the estimates of the ¯ parameters. Since we assumed a log-linear
speci¯cation for the Á functions, a given characteristics is said to have a positive (resp. null,
resp. negative) e®ect on the hazard rate when the corresponding parameter is positive (resp.
null, resp. negative).
25Table 7: The e®ect of observed characteristics on the three hazard rates
¯P ¯Z ¯Y ¯P ¯Z ¯Y
1fmaleg ¡:16¤ :025 :027¤ 1fblue colg :25¤ ¡:21¤ :096¤
age :2¤ :25¤ ¡:3¤ 1fwhite col unskg :39¤ ¡:33¤ :071¤
age2 ¡:28¤ ¡:3¤ :21¤ 1fwhite col skg :26¤ ¡:14¤ :0027
exp ¡:31¤ ¡:11¤ ¡:11¤ 1ftechnicalg :28¤ :0017 ¡:061¤
exp2 :18¤ :00014 :098¤ 1fsupervisorg :22¤ ¡:021 :011
1fFrenchg ¡:16¤ :33¤ ¡:16¤ 1fjr hs drop outg ¡:069¤ ¡:56¤ :13¤
1fchildreng :028 :1¤ ¡:031¤ 1fjr hs degreeg :1¤ :096¤ :02
1fmarriedg ¡:0047 ¡:12¤ :013 1fhs drop outg :18¤ ¡:011 :031¤
1fdep. 77g :14¤ :38¤ ¡:056¤ 1fhs degreeg :18¤ :02 ¡:029¤
1fdep. 78g ¡:066¤ :19¤ ¡:016 1funiv drop outg :24¤ :14¤ ¡:043¤
1fdep. 91g ¡:036 :42¤ :023¤ % treated last year ¡3:1¤ 1¤ :14
1fdep. 92g :25¤ ¡:0096 :011 growth of u. in°ow ¡:03 ¡:086 ¡:38¤
1fdep. 93g ¡:22¤ :17¤ ¡:087¤ # u spells in [t0 ¡ 2;t0] ¡:071¤ ¡:69¤ :24¤
1fdep. 94g :015 :27¤ ¡:0079 time u in [t0 ¡ 2;t0] ¡:18¤ ¡:34¤ ¡:037¤
1fdep. 95g :34¤ :068 ¡:094¤ # u spells in [t0 ¡ 5;t0 ¡ 2] ¡:038¤ ¡:34¤ :076¤
time u in [t0 ¡ 5;t0 ¡ 2] ¡:13¤ ¡:38¤ ¡:11¤
exp: experience, col: collar, sk: skilled, unsk: unskilled, jr: junior, hs: high school, univ: university and u: unemployment.
A star means that the estimate is signi¯cant at the 5% level.
We note that the three hazard rates depend on both age and experience. Married job
seekers are less likely to be treated whereas those who have children enter training programs
more quickly. None of these two characteristics a®ects the noti¯cation process. Looking at
the department dummies (dep. 77 to dep. 95), we see that the department 93, which has
a high unemployment rate, shows a slower noti¯cation process but a faster assignment to
26training programs than Paris (the reference). On the contrary, in the department 92, which
includes the business center of La D¶ efense and some of the wealthiest Parisian suburbs,
individuals are more likely to receive noti¯cation but face the same probability of being
treated or of leaving unemployment than Parisians. Looking at workers' quali¯cations, we
see that executives (the reference) receive fewer noti¯cations but are more likely to enter
a training program than other workers. This result con¯rms those of a recent ¯eld study
(Fleuret, 2006) on the assignment process to training. At the local unemployment agency
level, we note that agencies with a higher proportion of treated during the previous year will
also have a higher proportion of treated in the present year but a lower noti¯cation rate.
Lastly, individuals who spent more time unemployed or experienced more unemployment
spells over the last seven years are less likely to receive noti¯cation or to enter a training
program.
4.5 Unobserved heterogeneity
Table 8 shows the estimated probabilities for each group together with the (log-)e®ects of
unobserved heterogeneity on the three hazard rates. We note that group 4 has a probability
close to zero so the population is mainly split into three groups. Group 2 shows the lowest
propensity to be treated or to leave unemployment and a relatively low propensity to receive
noti¯cation. It is also much smaller than the other two groups, 1 and 3. It may re°ect
workers who are the most excluded from the labor market as they almost never participate
in a training program and are much more likely to experience long-term unemployment.
We now focus on groups 1 and 3 which represent more than 90% of the population.
Group 1 shows a relatively lower (resp. higher) propensity to be noti¯ed (resp. to enter a
training program). Group 3, the largest group in terms of probability, contains individuals
with the highest propensity to be noti¯ed but a lower propensity to enter a training program
than those in group 1. This could be interpreted as e®orts from the caseworkers to o®er
training programs to workers with a smaller propensity to look for such programs on their
own. We also note that workers in group 3 are more likely to leave unemployment quickly
but much less prone to participate in a training program than workers in group 1. We
may thus expect the estimates of the treatment e®ects to be a®ected by the presence of
unobserved heterogeneity. More precisely, if we do not account for such heterogeneity, we
may underestimate the e®ect of noti¯cation on training as well as the direct e®ect of training
on exit from unemployment. However, overlooking unobserved heterogeneity may lead to an
upwards bias of the e®ect of noti¯cation on exit from unemployment. Since this latter e®ect
was found to be negative (cf. Table 3) this bias may lead to accepting the NA assumption
(ln±P = 0) while it is in fact rejected by the data.
27Table 8: The distribution of unobserved heterogeneity (R = 4)

































To assess further the importance of unobserved heterogeneity and illustrate the conclu-
sions from Table 8, we present in Table 9 a comparison between two series of estimates of
(logarithms of) the main parameters: ±P, °P, ±Z and ±PZ. For each parameter, the number
on the left is the estimate from model (3) with no unobserved heterogeneity i.e. R = 0
while the number on the right is the estimate from the same model with our benchmark
speci¯cation of R = 4 groups of unobserved heterogeneity (which were the results shown in
Tables 3-5).
First, we note that the predictions from Table 8 are true i.e. the \homogenous" model
(R = 0) overestimates ±P and underestimates °P and (except on the long term) ±Z. The bias
on ±PZ (training preceded by noti¯cation) is more di±cult to interpret because it involves
the three duration processes.
A closer look at Table 9 reveals that the model with no unobserved heterogeneity leads
to qualitatively di®erent conclusions for two parameters. Indeed, it predicts that noti¯cation
still has an e®ect on unemployment after 6 months (ln±P = :127 with a standard error of .01)
whereas it has no e®ect in the model where we set R = 4. Also, the homogenous model points
at a signi¯cantly positive e®ect of training preceded by noti¯cation on unemployment after
4 months (ln±PZ = :147 with a standard error of .02), whereas the inclusion of unobserved
heterogeneity reveals that between the 4th and 12th months that follow training, workers are
still \locked in" unemployment (ln±PZ signi¯cantly negative at -.129).
In addition to these qualitatively biased conclusions, using the homogenous model leads
to a potentially large bias in the point estimates of the treatment e®ects. For instance, the
(logarithm of the) e®ect of noti¯cation on training after 3 months (°P) increases by a factor
3 when going from R = 0 to R = 4. The largest relative di®erence between point estimates
28lies in the long-term e®ect of training preceded by noti¯cation on exit from unemployment.
The last row of Table 9 shows that ln±PZ is 4 times smaller when introducing 4 groups of
unobserved heterogeneity. The fact that the largest biases are found for the parameter ±PZ
is not surprising as the related treatment (noti¯cation followed by training) and outcome
(exit from unemployment) involve the three duration processes.
Table 9: Estimates without (R = 0) and with (R = 4) unobserved heterogeneity
R = 0 R = 4
ln±P: ¡:252
(:02)
if t · P + 183 ¡:402
(:02)
if t · P + 183
:127
(:01)
if t > P + 183 ¡:0014
(:03)
if t > P + 183
ln°P: 2:62
(:02)
if t · P + 92 4:45
(:10)
if t · P + 92
1:09
(:03)
if t > P + 92 3:26
(:11)
if t > P + 92
ln±Z: ¡:877
(:03)
if t · Z + 123 ¡:775
(:040)
if t · Z + 123
:101
(:02)
if Z + 365 ¸ t > Z + 123 :125
(:033)
if Z + 365 ¸ t > Z + 123
:495
(:02)
if t > Z + 365 :372
(:037)
if t > Z + 365
ln±PZ: ¡:984
(:04)
if t · Z + 123 ¡1:17
(:041)
if t · Z + 123
:147
(:02)
if Z + 365 ¸ t > Z + 123 ¡:129
(:025)
if Z + 365 ¸ t > Z + 123
:591
(:02)
if t > Z + 365 :148
(:028)
if t > Z + 365
5 Conclusion
The methodological contribution of this paper is to extend the standard ToE model to
allow for information shocks that may precede participation to treatment, and to present
29the assumptions under which the identi¯cation of each e®ect of interest is achieved. Our
dynamic setting is thus more general than the previous studies conducted on anticipation
e®ects of training programs and could be taken to other empirical applications. An important
result is that the assumption that individuals do not anticipate future treatments, which
numerous evaluations of active labor market policies (ALMPs) rely on, is violated in our data.
Estimations based on the ToE approach that do not take the noti¯cation process into account
may thus be biased. This is a case for restricting the validity conditions of the standard ToE
approach when data on noti¯cation are not available. Using a partial-information model
and the results we derived, we run a conclusive robustness check that shows that our results
on individuals' anticipation behavior do not depend on our speci¯cation of the treatment
e®ects.
As for policy implications, our paper shows that noti¯cation of future training programs
actually decreases the exit rate from unemployment. This result goes against several other
evaluations, which provide evidence of some \threat e®ect" of ALMPs. Yet, this fact has to be
interpreted in the light of the French institutional setting, in which training is not mandatory.
In most cases, French job seekers rarely face sanctions if they do not participate in a training
program, so it is hardly surprising that noti¯cation tends to lengthen their unemployment
duration. On the other hand, French policy makers could consider imposing mandatory
training measures from a predetermined date in the unemployment spell. This could help
drawing the line between those job seekers whose search e®ort is high, but unfruitful, and
those with a higher preference for leisure, who will presumably exit unemployment on their
own at the approach of entry into training. More generally, future research on ALMPs should
use data on the assignment process to study the anticipation of treatments and thus o®er a
more detailed analysis of the e®ects of training programs.
A natural extension to the present analysis would consist in taking a closer look at the
anticipation behavior of unemployed workers and try to understand their response to in-
formation shocks. Such an analysis could build on structural job search models (see for
instance the recent contribution by Van den Berg et al., 2009) and allow the workers' reser-
vation values to depend on the opportunity to enter a training program. One interpretation
of our result that goes against a threat e®ect of noti¯cation could indeed be that, due to
the non-enforcing nature of training o®ers, noti¯cation just presents job seekers with a new
alternative that will increase their reservation value and thus lenghten their unemployment
spell. It would be interesting to take this interpretation to the data using a structural model.
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32APPENDIX
A Technical assumptions for the benchmark model.
Our benchmark model (3) extends the AVdB approach to the case of three processes. We here adapt
the technical regularity assumptions of AVdB to our model in order to derive our identi¯cation
results. These assumptions are:
- the three functions, ÁP, ÁZ and ÁY are continuous from the space of X to R¤+ and all equal to
1 for some value x¤,
- the three functions ¸P, ¸Z and ¸Y (all going from R+ to R+¤) have ¯nite integrals ¤P(t) = R t
0 ¸P(¿)d¿, ¤Z(t) =
R t
0 ¸Z(¿)d¿ and ¤Y (t) =
R t
0 ¸Y (¿)d¿. Also, there is a given t¤ 2 R+ such that
¤P(t¤) = ¤ZP(t¤) = ¤Y (t¤) = 1.


































and ¢P, ­P, ¡P and ªP are continuous for all p 2 R+;t > p;x, ¢Z and ­Z are continuous for all
z 2 R+;t > z;x and ¢PZ and ­PZ are continuous for all p 2 R+;z > p;t > z;x.
B Proofs of Propositions 2 and 3.








exp(¡u1vP ¡ u2vZ ¡ u3vY )dG(vP;vZ;vY );
as well as the marginal derivatives: L
(P)
G = @LG=@u1, L
(Z)
G = @LG=@u2 and L
(PZ)
G = @2LG=@u1@u2.
Note also that the following will use notations introduced in section A of the Appendix. Lastly, we
now write the conditioning on x in the notations of the Q functions from (5).
Proof of Proposition 2. We just need to show that we can identify the ±P and °P functions
since the other functions are identi¯ed from Propostion 1. We start with ±P. The restricted data Q1
contains QP(p;yjx). Since Pr(Z > Y jx) is observed, the function RP(y;pjx) = QP(p;yjx)=Pr(Z >
Y jx) = Pr(Y > y;P > p;Y > PjZ > Y;x) is observed. We can then use RP(y;pjx) and the prop-





G (¤P(p)ÁP(x);0;[¤Y (p) + ­P(y;p;x)]ÁY (x)): (B1)
33The right-hand-side of (B1) is a strictly increasing and identi¯ed function of ­P(y;p;x) so ­P(y;p;x)
is identi¯ed. Then, since ¸P is known, ±P(y;p;x) is identi¯ed for all y > p.
To complete the proof of Proposition 2, we need to show that °P is identi¯ed. Similarly to
what we just did for ±P, we consider the function RPZ(p;z) = QPZ(p;z;¡1)=Pr(Y > Z) which is





G (¤P(p)ÁP(x);[¤Z(p) + ªP(z;p;x)]ÁZ(x);0); (B2)
where the right-hand-side is again a strictly increasing and identi¯ed function of ªP(z;p;x) so
ªP(z;p;x) is identi¯ed and then so is °P(z;p;x) for all z > p. This ends the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof builds on the same approach as above. Using the functions















[¤Y (p) + ­P(z;p;x) + ­PZ(y;p;z;x)]ÁY (x)
´
: (B4)
The right-hand-side of (B3) is a strictly increasing and identi¯ed function of ­Z(y;z;x) so ­Z(y;z;x)
is identi¯ed and then so is ±Z(y;z;x) for all y > z. The right-hand-side of (B4) is a strictly increasing
and identi¯ed function of ­PZ(y;p;z;x) so ­PZ(y;p;z;x) is identi¯ed and then so is ±PZ(y;p;z;x)
for all y > z > p. This ends the proof.
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